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Abstract in English 
Starting with a ‘greenfield’ situation, we discuss reasons for market failure in road 
infrastructure provision. We show why it may not be optimal from a welfare perspective to 
leave road provision fully to the market and government intervention in this sector can improve 
welfare. Government intervention comes in different forms, such as financial intervention 
(taxation, subsidies), regulation (price, quality, environmental), and public provision of roads or 
road services. The analysis of the literature regarding government instruments allows us to 
establish a correspondence between different forms of market failure and instruments. Several 
case studies of particular road infrastructure projects are included to illustrate the use of 
government instruments. 
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Abstract in Dutch 
Aan de hand van een ‘maaiveld’-situatie bespreken wij redenen voor marktfalen waardoor de 
voorziening van weginfrastructuur door de markt mogelijk niet optimaal is vanuit een 
welvaartperspectief. Overheidsingrijpen kan dan de welvaart verhogen. Wij onderscheiden de 
volgende vormen van overheidsingrepen bij de weginfrastructuur: financiële instrumenten 
(belastingen of subsidies), regulering (prijs, kwaliteit, milieuregels) en publieke voorziening. 
Uit de analyse van bestaande literatuur over de overheidsinstrumenten volgt welke 
overheidsinstrumenten bij welk marktfalen horen. Het rapport bevat enkele casestudies van 
afzonderlijke infrastructuurprojecten ter illustratie van het gebruik van overheidsinstrumenten 
bij marktfalen.  
 
Steekwoorden: wegeninfrastructuur, overheidsbeleid, publiekprivate samenwerking (PPS) 
 
Een uitgebreide Nederlandse samenvatting is beschikbaar via www.cpb.nl.   4   5 
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Preface 
This CPB-Document reviews economic arguments concerning the role of the government in 
road provision. In the Netherlands, the government has always been playing a major role in the 
planning and provision of the road infrastructure. This basic principle has not been debated until 
recently; however, recent papers and reports
1 introduce the idea of a larger role for market 
mechanisms in this sector of the economy. 
Starting with a ‘greenfield’ situation, this CPB-document discusses the public and private sector 
roles in the provision of roads. In the case of road infrastructure, the term ‘greenfield’ may be 
taken quite literally. Therefore, the main line of the document is built around an example 
literally consisting of a green field, in which farms, mills and villages are connected by roads in 
order to produce and trade. This easily accessible example illustrates main economic concepts 
and arguments behind government intervention in road provision, as well as respective 
government instruments, while more complex technical issues are confined to text boxes 
accompanying the main text. 
The report has been written by Mark Lijesen (project leader) and Victoria Shestalova. The 
authors benefited from many useful comments and suggestions of the project ‘feedback group’ 
that included both policy makers and researchers: Rosemarie Bastianen, Roger Demkes, 
Edward van Os and Pim Warffemius from the Ministry of Transport, Ivana Gomesdurao from 
the Ministry of Finance, Joost Passenier from the Ministry of Economic Affairs, August Mesker 
from VNO-NCW, and Erik Verhoef from the Free University of Amsterdam. The authors also 
acknowledge helpful comments of Joost Poort from SEO and CPB-colleagues Paul Besseling, 
Paul de Bijl, Casper van Ewijk and Rafael Saitua Nistal. The responsibility for this publication 






1 See e.g. the document ‘A different way to pay for mobility’ published by a governmental commission.   8   9 
Summary 
The document reviews economic arguments concerning the scope for the government in road 
provision. Starting with a ‘greenfield’ situation, we analyse possible reasons for market failure 
in road provision, explaining why the government may need to intervene in this sector of the 
economy. Market failures in road provision can relate to (a) public good features such as non-
excludability and non-rivalry; (b) market power of the owner; (c) external benefits, such as 
positive effects on labour mobility and economic growth; as well as (d) external costs, including 
congestion, pollution, and other environmental damage.  
 
Government intervention comes in different forms, such as financial intervention (taxation, 
subsidies), regulation (price, quality, environmental), and public provision. The analysis of the 
literature regarding government instruments allows us to establish a correspondence between 
the forms of market failures and instruments. 
Financial intervention 
Subsidies (compensating the owner for the external benefits that a private road delivers to the 
society) are the least intrusive form of government intervention to encourage optimal 
investment. While subsidies are used to internalise external benefits, taxes work in the opposite 
way, providing an instrument to internalise external costs. However, not all types of market 
failures can be dealt with by financial instruments, e.g. financial instruments cannot prevent 
market power of the private owner. Besides, information asymmetry may make it difficult to 
calculate optimal subsidies and taxes. 
Regulation 
Regulation is generally more intrusive than subsidies. However, one of its forms, called 
‘universal service obligation’ (USO), works in economic terms similarly to subsidies, as the 
compensation of the cost of USO involves cross-subsidization. Price regulation such as 
restrictions on tolls can prevent excessive pricing by private owners. Historically, cost-based 
and price-cap regulation models have been used in regulatory practices. However the modern 
theory and practice (from other sectors of the economy) point towards the use of more market-
oriented regulation models, such as ‘yardstick competition’ and competition for the market, for 
example, through procurement auctions.  
 
Quality regulation can take a form of quality standards, e.g. with respect to safety and design. 
Such standards can be complemented by economic incentives, which can be created by 
integration of price and quality regulation. Environmental and safety norms can affect the 
design and location of the roads. Examples include norms on noise, norms restricting the 
distance of roads from residential houses, safety norms and so on.   10 
Public provision 
From the economic theory perspective, as long as quality is contracted, both private parties and 
government organisations should be equally able to deliver public goods and services. 
However, the outcome may be different in the case of non-contractible quality. In particular, 
private ownership is not optimal in the case of a large detrimental effect of cost reductions on 
non-contractible quality. In such a case the government should have more control over the asset 
and service provision.  
 
Uncertainty about future developments may be another reason for the presence of the 
government in the road sector. Since the geography of the regions changes with time, so does 
the road infrastructure. As it would be too costly to predict all possible contingencies that may 
be relevant for the development of the road infrastructure in the future, contracts with private 
providers are inheritably incomplete. Therefore, contractual design should not neglect the 
uncertainty regarding future changes. 
 
Economic literature also warns that government failure may arise when governments intervene. 
Government failure may be associated with information asymmetry, X-inefficiency (especially 
under full government provision), lobbying, a short-term horizon of government officials, 
regulatory capture and corruption. Therefore, policy makers should take these risks into account 
when choosing the degree of government intervention. The welfare loss due to government 
failure should be weighed against the welfare loss of market failure. 
Case studies 
The case studies included in this document highlight the importance of contractual design. The 
experience of the privately owned State Route 91 in California shows potential market power 
problems that can result under full private ownership because of contractual incompleteness. 
Government participation in the infrastructure provision, for example in the form of a public-
private partnership, leaves the government with more control over the situation than in the case 
of fully-private provision. However, here again, flaws in contractual design may lead to 
excessive rents to the private party. So in the case of the Wijkertunnel, the contractual design 
was such that the payment to the private party by the state appeared to be sensitive to the 
changes in assumptions, in particular, those related to traffic volumes. The rents of the private 
providers have increased substantially with the increase of traffic volumes. 
 
With respect to congestion issues, we observe (based on theoretical and empirical literature) 
that flexible time-varying tolls work well solving congestion on the tolled road, hence, market 
mechanisms are capable of solving this problem. 
   11 
1  Introduction 
Throughout the larger part of the twentieth century, governments were seen as the obvious 
providers of road infrastructure. This role is no longer taken for granted. Favourable 
experiences with private involvement, as well as technological change ask for a reconsideration 
of institutional arrangements regarding road infrastructure. 
A brief history 
Roads have been around for six thousand years now, the oldest paved roads dating back to 4000 
BC in the Indus valley. The Roman Empire was famous for its vast road network, but many 
other civilizations (Chinese, Mayas, Incas, and Persians) had similar networks. The Roman road 
network was under the responsibility of the empire’s army, though civilians were allowed to use 
them.  
 
Road construction and maintenance outside or after the Roman Empire was traditionally 
organized by local communities. Such communities, dating back to the Iron Age, still exist in 
Sweden. In Britain, so-called ‘Turnpike Trusts’ started toll-financed road construction and 
maintenance from the start of the eighteenth century, but the system was abolished in 1844 after 
violent protests over the height of the tolls. 
 
In the twentieth century, road construction and maintenance was mainly in the hands of 
governments, with the rapid development of the German Autobahn-network as a noteworthy 
example. By the end of the twentieth century, the role of the private sector gradually increased, 
gaining momentum with the privatization wave started by the Thatcher administration in 
Britain. 
Research goal 
Like in other countries, the dominant role of government in road infrastructure in The 
Netherlands is subject of debate. In their latest policy paper on mobility, Dutch government 
promised to initiate a research project aimed at exploring other ways to organize road 
infrastructure. This project is now well under way and has some obvious common ground with 
the study presented in this document. 
 
Although many economic studies have been conducted regarding institutional arrangements 
concerning road infrastructure, we note that a straightforward survey of market failure and 
government failure seems to be lacking. This document tries to fill that gap, thus defining the 
research purpose as an exploration of the (economically) optimal role of government in the 
supply chain of road infrastructure provision.   12 
 
Research definition 
The research presented here is merely a primer, discussing the basic theoretical notions behind 
road infrastructure institutions.
2 This implies that we ignore many details and complexities that 
are related to the topic. We briefly discuss the most important ones below 
 
Road infrastructure is strongly linked to government through spatial planning. We touch upon 
this subject when discussing external costs, but leave a great number of aspects undiscussed. 
Spatial planning of road infrastructure requires an integral appraisal of many aspects and 
interests, one of which is the role of the land owners. They would theoretically be able to block 
roads if governments would not have the means to enforce spatial policy. 
 
In this study, we treat roads as just roads. In practice, roads come at different hierarchy levels 
and with different functions. Roads with different hierarchy levels (e.g. a trunk road versus a 
highway) are often complementary and sometimes (imperfectly) competing at the same time. 
One might for instance cross France from North to South without paying toll by using 
secondary roads. Interrelations between roads from different hierarchy levels may be important 
in the presence of market power for instance, or if they have different owners. Roads of a lower 
hierarchy often have other functions than transport alone. Especially urban roads are often also 
used for vending, recreation and so on. As we ignore these other functions in our analysis, we 
implicitly limit the relevance of our analysis to high hierarchy roads. 
 
One other element we (almost) ignore is the fact that roads are part of a network. Several issues 
related to the network character of roads, such as network spillovers, demand uncertainty and 
complementary versus competing roads, are merely touched upon and not treated in depth. 
 
A final important point to be mentioned is that distributional considerations are neglected in our 
paper. In this respect, our research differs from more integral approaches like the one adopted 
by Teulings et al. (2003). In the case of roads, regional distribution is probably more important 
than income distribution, although the latter may not be trivial in practice, and may indeed form 
a motive for government intervention. 
 
 
2 Studies that provide similar basic insights on the related topic of public-private partnerships include Bartelsman et al. 
(1998) and Grout (1997).   13 
2  Approach 
2.1  Market failure, government failure and the greenfield approach 
One of the central theorems in welfare economics is that under certain conditions markets, if 
left to themselves, render socially optimal outcomes. The conditions however may be 
restrictive. They require that first, every relevant good should be traded in a market at publicly 
known prices; and second, households and firms act perfectly competitively, in other words, 
each individual firm or consumer cannot strategically influence the price, and is therefore 
considered a price-taker (Mas-Colell et al., 1995). In this case the ‘invisible hand’ of the market 
should guide the outcome towards the optimum.  
Marginal cost pricing and cost recovery 
Perfect markets are generally associated with marginal cost pricing, i.e. prices exactly equalling marginal costs, so that 
the price covers the cost of producing one extra unit of the product. In theory, such a pricing mechanism delivers an 
efficient level of production. However, it can almost never be applied in reality because of the cost recovery problem.  
 
Roads,  as  well  as  other  infrastructure,  exhibit  high  investment  costs  (both  sunk  and  fixed)  and  relatively  small 
production  (or  variable)  costs.  Therefore  average  costs  typically  exceed  the  marginal  costs  of  provision,  so  that 
systematic losses would be incurred with marginal cost pricing, which would make provision of such goods impossible. 
A lump-sum subsidy covering fixed costs can make sure the revenue requirements are met. When a lump-subsidy is not 
an option, a ‘second-best’ pricing option can be developed. In particular, Baumol and Bradford (1970) proposed ‘optimal 
departures from marginal cost pricing’ in the form of so-called ‘Ramsey pricing’ (owning to Ramsey, 1927). These prices 
are based on marginal costs, but are adjusted so that total revenues cover total costs. The adjustment takes account of 
the different price elasticities among consumer groups. A higher price is charged to consumers with more inelastic 
demand and a lower price to those with more elastic demand. This reduces distortions in consumers’ choices. 
 
In the case of roads, markets do not always exist and ‘prices’ in terms of costs and benefits of 
the road players are not transparent. Where the market exists, price-taking behaviour is rarely 
the case, because the (unregulated) road owner has all control over the prices. Hence, the 
welfare theorem does not guarantee optimality. When the market fails to deliver an optimal 
allocation, government intervention may help to counteract these market failures. Note however 
that governments, like markets, can fail, and the welfare loss due to government failure should 
be weighed against the welfare loss of market failure. 
We use a so-called greenfield approach to identify possible sources of market failure in the 
provision of road infrastructure, meaning that we define a virtual situation without any 
government intervention. Starting from this situation, we “sit back” and look what happens. 
Will the market produce the optimal outcome, or will market failure arise? And if market failure 
arises, what form could it take, what possible instruments for government intervention are 
available and what types of government failure may arise when the government intervenes?   14 
This greenfield approach may look unrealistic to some people as government intervention is 
very common in road infrastructure. This may seem a disadvantage of the approach, but it is an 
advantage at the same time. Analyzing this issue while ignoring current institutional settings 
helps us distinguishing economic arguments from those partly motivated by other 
considerations. Note that in modern day society, governments inevitably intervene in spatial 
planning, thus establishing a de facto role for government in road infrastructure. The debate 
should therefore focus on the scope of government intervention, rather than on arguments in 
favour and against government intervention. 
 
In the case of road infrastructure, the term greenfield may be taken quite literally, as we will do 
in our analysis. We use an example, literally consisting of a green field, in which farms, mills 
and villages are connected by roads in order to produce and trade. The example illustrates 
possible sources of market and government failures, and is accompanied by text boxes 
discussing each of the issues from a theoretical perspective. These text boxes also supply the 
reader with references for further reading. 
2.2  The chain approach to road infrastructure 
A common way to analyze an industry or a production process, is to define it as a chain of 
activities, at the end of which a product or service is delivered. Economic literature on public-
private partnerships in infrastructure (e.g. Hall, 1998; Fernandes and Viegas, 1999) often 
applies this approach, distinguishing between the major activities labelled design, build, finance 







3 Several other abbreviations, using these terms, also exist. Other terms, such as bid, transfer and own are sometimes 
included, reflecting differences in the project organisation and ownership pattern. Also see the appendix.   15 
3  Market failure  
3.1  Introduction 
We use a simple example to illustrate our theoretical findings by. This simple example literally 
consists of a green field. Somewhere in this field lies a wheat farm, and a little further we 
recognize the distinct features of a grain mill. To produce flour, the farmer needs to transport 
wheat to the grain mill. It is in the common interest of the farmer and the owner of the mill to 
build a road between the farm and the mill, and the question who pays and owns the road is 
merely a matter of welfare distribution.
4 
 
A little further in the field lies a village with a bakery. The owner of the mill would like to 
transport the wheat to the bakery, and again it is in the common interest of the baker and the 
miller to build a road. 
 
In a complete contract world, the private sector has no problem in financing, building and 
operating roads. Should either the farmer, the miller or the baker have insufficient funds to 
build one of the roads, then we can only conclude that the value of their production is 
insufficient, and not producing, hence not transporting, the good is optimal from a welfare point 
of view. 
 
Now let us complicate things a little. First, we mirror the situation we reached so far. Let us say 
the farm is so large that it needs two mills and two bakeries to process its production. The total 
network now looks like this: 
 
 
4 Here, we speak about a world of complete contracts. Contracts are complete, if the parties to an agreement could specify 
their respective rights and duties for every possible future state of the world, i.e., there are no gaps in terms of the contract. 
However, because it would be prohibitively expensive to write a complete contract, contracts in the real world are usually 
incomplete.   16 







Still, the private sector has had no problem in financing, building and operating roads. After all, 
nothing fundamental has changed in comparison to the situation before we mirrored the 
network. There is a difference though, since the roads now connect two villages. Apart from 
facilitating the transport of wheat and flour, the roads facilitate all kinds of transport between 
the two villages. A potential source of misallocation arises, because travellers between the 
villages use the roads without having to bear the costs they impose. This implies that travellers 
may use the road even if this would be economically unviable. It also implies that there is no 
incentive for the road owners to expand the capacity, even if the volume of economically viable 
trips urges them to do so. Furthermore, the incentive for the villagers to build a direct road 
between the villages is weakened, since they can use the village-mill-farm-mill-village road at 
no cost. 
3.2  Public goods 
These problems can easily be solved without government intervention, as long as sufficient 
institutional arrangements are in place to allow for a market for road usage.
5 The road owners 
can now set a price for road use, imputing costs on the use of the road and creating a reward for 
expanding capacity in case this is needed. Introducing a market also implies the possibility of 
the introduction of market failure, however. Notably, the costs of collecting payments for road 
use may be high relative to the marginal cost of road use itself. So transaction costs are a 
potential source of market failure here. 
 
5 These institutional arrangements include basic institutions like property rights, law enforcement and the existence of means 
of payment.   17 
Are roads public goods? 
In the literature, roads (as well as other types of transport infrastructure) are often seen as public good, justifying 
government  intervention  in  this  sector.  (See  Klein,  2002.)  Free  access  roads,  which  are  characterised  by  non-
excludability and non-rivalry, are indeed a typical example of public good. However, this argument does not hold for 
private toll roads. Numerous examples of the latter show that there is a practical way to overcome non-excludability at a 
reasonably low cost and that toll roads can be privately operated and financed.  
 
The use of uncongested roads is non-rival. Non-rivalry in consumption implies that for optimality the marginal cost of the 
good  provision  should  equate  the  sum  of  the  marginal  willingness  to  pay  summed  over  all  consumers.  Under 
information asymmetry on both supply and demand sides, markets, as well as a central planners, may fail to provide an 
efficient amount of roads.  
 
On the demand side, the main trade-off is between efficiency and minimum rights (Martimort et al., 2005). This trade-off 
gives  a  theoretical foundation to  the  famous free-riding  problem for  a  public  good:  large  groups of  individuals  will 
underreport their value of the good and hence their willingness to pay, which will lead to underprovision compared to the 
optimum. On the supply side, the main trade-off arises between efficiency versus rent extraction. If a central planner 
pays for the road provision from the tax revenue and cannot observe the type of provider, an efficient provider is able to 
collect the information rent. 
 
Note that non-rivalry occurs for part of the day only, which allows for peak load pricing. As Boiteux (1961) shows, peak 
load pricing is welfare optimizing under normal economic assumptions, thus overcoming the non-rivalry problem. 
 
Still, public good considerations can not always be dismissed, since private toll collection sometimes can be infeasible 
or  costly.  The  reasons  are  either  legal  or  economic:  for  instance,  tolls  can  be  prohibited  or  restricted  by  law,  or 
alternatively, tolls’ collection costs can be relatively high for certain roads. See examples in Klein, 2002, and Ivarsson et 
al., 2003. Curiously, even for free (or almost free) access roads, history provides examples of private financing, such as 
private financing of Turnpike roads in early America and private provision of local roads that still exists in Sweden. In 
both examples, financing comes from people living in the neighbourhood of the road and benefiting from the presence of 
this infrastructure the most.     
 
Klein (2002) discusses the American experience with Turnpike companies, most of which were privately financed (by 
private subscription to stock). These companies started in the 1790s and mostly declined in 1830s. Legal restrictions on 
toll collection have made these roads be characterised by non-excludability. People using the road did not pay (or paid 
very little) for the use, nor people living in the neighbourhood paid for the benefits that they had. Therefore, the turnpike 
roads were not profitable. Stock subscription was the means to pay for the road benefits. Speaking theoretically, such a 
model of financing should have met an unavoidable free-rider problem. However, early Americans appeared to be very 
cooperative and were willing to contribute to the roads much more than a simple theory would predict: social pressures 
and  ‘selective’  incentives  (i.e.  incentives  of  an  individual  who  feels  as  a  part  of  a  group)  played  a  huge  role  in 
overcoming the free-rider problem.  
   18 
3.3  Market power  
Another type of market failure that we may encounter is that of market power. In the current 
lay-out, there is only one road between the villages, leaving travellers no other choice than to 
use that road or not to travel at all. This leaves the owners in the position to charge road prices 
far above the cost level, which will lead to the cancellation of trips that would have been 
economically viable, and hence to a loss of welfare. A way around this would be for the 
villagers (or in fact, for any entrepreneur) to build a second road between the villages, so that 
competition would reduce market power.  
 
Even if the villagers would not build the second road, the mere (credible) threat that they might 
could force the road owners to refrain from abusing their market power. This phenomenon is 
known as contestability of a market. For a market to be contestable, barriers to entry should be 
absent, which is not the case for most routes. Barriers to entry may either be legal, or follow 
from the nature of production. 
More on market power 
In contrast to the previous type of market failure that arises under non-excludability, market power can arise for limited 
access roads. Because of large fixed costs and economies of density, building several parallel roads would generally be 
inefficient. (Baumol et al., 1982.) Although there are sometimes alternative ways of travelling between two places, most 
roads  are  generally  not  perfect  substitutes,  and  do  not  face  sufficient  competition  from  other  roads  or  other 
transportation modes, such as air or rail transport. This monopolistic character of the road infrastructure provision can 
lead  to  rationing  and  excessive  prices.  Finally,  lack  of  competition  reduces  incentives  for  cost-efficient  road 
infrastructure provision.  
 
Market power may arise at different stages of the DBFO-chain. In the Design-phase, land-owners have considerable 
market power. Even if imperfect substitutes (e.g. a different route, crossing someone else’s land) are available, the 
impact in the planning phase of a road can be substantial. Market power in this phase is one of the reasons why 
governments  play  a  strong  role  in  spatial  planning,  which  is  beyond  the  scope  of  this  study,  but  can  not  be  left 
unmentioned in any study concerning the role of governments in road infrastructure. 
 
In the Build-phase, builders may have market power if scarce knowledge is required in this phase. The more complex 
the building project, the more likely the occurrence of this type of market power is. Note that market power in the build 
phase may partly be prevented in the Design-phase, by choosing a design that does not require scarce knowledge. 
Obviously, costs and benefits of the alternative design should be weighed against each other. 
 
Finally, in the Finance and Operate phase, the road owner may have market power vis-à-vis road users. This is the type 
of market power that we refer to in the text of this section. 
   19 
In the case of roads, duplication of the network will probably be inefficient as long as the 
network is not at or near full capacity. Road networks, like many other networks, have 
relatively large fixed costs and using them more intensively brings down the costs per user. 
These scale economies - or more precise: economies of density - may even be so large that 
monopoly provision is more efficient than provision by multiple suppliers, in which case a so-
called natural monopoly arises. 
3.4  External costs 
Now let us return to the farmer who started the road network. The road running by his farm 
facilitates his own traffic to both mills, but it also facilitates traffic from village 1 to 2. All these 
vehicles running past his farm are starting to annoy the farmer. Furthermore, with increasing 
traffic it is getting harder for the farmer to reach his fields on the other side of the road. This 
phenomenon is known as external effects, the economic definition of which is that they are 
effects caused by an economic transaction and imposed on parties that have no part in the 
transaction. Negative external effects are also labelled external costs. 
 
The main problem with external effects is that they are not taken into account when someone 
makes a decision, since the effect is imposed on someone else. Suppose that one of the villagers 
in village 2 is planning a trip to either one of the other villages. Before going on this trip, the 
villager weighs the costs of the trip against the benefits and finds that the benefits are slightly 
higher. If the villager were to consider the nuisance imposed on people near the road as well, he 
might decide not to make the trip, as the costs would be slightly higher than the benefits. But 
because these costs are external, the villager will not take them into account, and he will make a 
decision that increases his own welfare, but decreases total welfare. 
 
Note that most of the external costs of road transport are related to road usage rather than to 
roads themselves. The exceptions are visual nuisance of the road itself and the fact that a road 
may act as a barrier, either in social traffic (think of two neighbourhoods, separated by a busy 
road), or in ecological traffic. In the latter case, road use is still the main driver for the external 
effect, as an unused road hardly constitutes a barrier.   20 
More on external costs 
External effects (also: externalities) are defined as situations in which the private costs or benefits to the producers or 
purchasers of a good or service differs from the total social costs or benefits entailed in its production and consumption.
6 
In particular, an externality arises whenever the actions of one party affect the well-being of another party. The effect 
can be positive and negative. In this box we focus on negative external effects of roads, distinguishing externalities 
caused by the traffic and by the infrastructure itself.  
 
Road transport in general causes several types of negative external effects. The most important are environmental 
externalities (such as noise, pollution and barrier formation) and congestion and accident externalities that the users 
impose on each other. While it is generally clear what is meant under environmental externalities, we need to discuss 
congestion in more detail.  
 
Congestion is a special type of a negative externality. On an individual level, congestion is external, since a driver does 
not take into account the delay that his presence may impose on others if the road is near its capacity. However, if we 
look at the system level, congestion is fully internalized. Road users impose delays on each other rather than on people 
outside the group of road users. At the system level, congestion is therefore not an externality, but rather an inefficient 
way of rationing excess demand. There is a broad literature on congestion issues, including Meiburg (1963), Newbery 
(1989), Verhoef (2002), etc. Environmental and congestion effects of heavy trucks are analysed in Parry (2006).  
 
The findings with respect to accident externality are parallel with those on congestion externalities in that a larger 
external accident cost arises at high traffic flows. Dickerson et al. (2000) finds that while there is a nearly proportional 
relationship between the accidents and traffic flow for low and medium flows, the marginal accident rate raises above 
the average at higher traffic flows.  
 
Apart from the externalities associated with transport, road infrastructure itself causes little externalities (exceptions are 
barrier formation and visual pollution). However, it may be efficient to adjust the infrastructure in the construction phase 
in order to mitigate external effects of the use of roads. Noise nuisance for instance could be mitigated by building 
acoustic screens. The benefits of reducing the damage to the environment have to be traded off against the extra 
construction costs which this would require. See for example a cost-benefit analyse for the Zuidas Amsterdam by 
Eijgenraam and Ossokina (2006). Since private parties will not internalise social costs and benefits, the market will not 




6 This definition is taken from the Glossary of Political Economy terms on http://www.adburn.edu.   21 
3.5  External Benefits 
Let us now return to our green field example and suppose that the villagers have found some 
way around these problems. Now, we add a third village, and suppose that trade opportunities 
between villages 1 and 3 are large enough to facilitate the construction of a new road. This 
changes the situation as follows.  








The new road has a positive value for the inhabitants of village 2, as their travel possibilities are 
now extended; they can now also travel to village 3. Moreover, the value of the road between 
villages 1 and 2 has increased as well, since it now also facilitates travel to village 3. This 
phenomenon is referred to in economic literature as network externalities, meaning that the 
expansion of a network increases the value of existing links in the network. 
 
One may wonder why network externalities are considered a market failure. On first sight it 
simply looks like the users of the network receive a free bonus. The problem with network 
externalities is that prices get distorted, and this influences economic decisions. What if the road 
to village 3 in our previous example were marginally unviable, but would increase total welfare 
because of the network externalities? Then the road would not be built and the market outcome 
would not be optimal. In some cases, the existence of network externalities therefore requires 
some form of coordination. 
 
The second reason that network externalities are considered a market failure is that they 
constitute a serious barrier to entry. If the value of a network increases with the number of   22 
connections, any existing network is worth more than a start-up, and a customer is more likely 
to choose the existing network over the start-up. This barrier to entry hinders the competition 
between networks, which in turn may lead to market power. 
 
Now that the three villages are connected, their economies are thriving. The roads between 
them facilitate welfare-enhancing trade and economic activity is booming. Soon, road capacity 
becomes insufficient, and road users start demanding for more capacity. They claim that the 
government should take care of more capacity, as the thriving economy is a positive external 
effect of these roads.  
 
This is a common misunderstanding about roads. It is obviously correct that roads facilitate 
trade and hence can boost economic growth. These effects are however not external, as they 
accrue to the road users themselves, either directly (in the case of a trader) or through prices. A 
notable exception to this rule is the case where markets function better merely because of the 
ability to transport goods or people. Labour force mobility, in particular, leads to more 
flexibility at the labour market. Less transportation constraints mean more competition between 
producers located in different regions, the benefits of which may accrue to other people than the 
ones using the road. This is an external benefit of roads, also labelled spillovers. 
 
Note that the external benefits discussed in this section are all related to the mere availability of 
road connections, whereas the external costs discussed in the previous section are strongly 
linked to the actual use of the road. 
More on external benefits 
Katz and Shapiro (1985) define network externalities, stating that for some products the utility for the user increases with 
the number of consumers of the good. The obvious example of network externalities is that of telecommunications, 
where an increase of the number of connections increase the value of an individual connection. Many networks have 
some type of network externalities present. The paper by Katz and Shapiro also discuss the implications of these 
externalities for competition between networks and for the compatibility of competing networks. 
 
Numerous empirical papers find a positive effect of road infrastructure on growth and other economic indicators. In 
particular, Pareira (2006) finds a significant effect of investment in the road infrastructure on investment, employment 
and growth in Portugal. For Germany, Stefan (1997) reports a positive effect of the road infrastructure on the German 
manufacturing industry. However, there are also some studies finding no important productivity spillovers. For example, 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1995), who analyse the effects on productivity in the US, find no important effects. 
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3.6  Conclusions 
Based on our analysis of market failure in road infrastructure provision, we identify those that 
require government intervention. In particular, government intervention may be needed to 
overcome the public good problem that sometimes arises in the road provision. However, there 
are also situations in which private financing is also a viable option. A private owner is 
generally well equipped to solve congestion and other network externality problems. Given 
non-contestability for many roads, private ownership may be associated with market power. 
Therefore, government has a role in curbing this market power of a private owner. Finally, the 
government may also play a role in internalising external effects for the economy arising due to 
the road presence and use. In the next chapter we discuss instruments that the government can 
use to prevent market failure and possible problems that may arise when the government 
intervene. Since government intervention may be not failure free, optimal policy have to find a 
balance between the two extremes: fully public and fully private provision.   24   25 
4  Instruments and government failure 
4.1  Introduction 
In the previous chapter we have identified several sources of market failure. Market failure may 
give rise to government intervention. When considering government intervention, one should 
keep in mind that governments, like markets, are subject to failure. Government intervention 
comes in different types. Several ways exist to distinguish between types of government 
intervention. We use the following, fairly crude, distinction, which is not uncommon in Public 
Finance and Public Economics: 
 
·  Regulation (price, quality, environmental) 
·  Financial instruments (taxes, subsidies) 
·  Public provision 
 
The table below confronts the types of market failures distinguished in the previous chapter 
with this crude distinction between government instruments. 
Table 4.1  Market failures versus government instruments 
  Regulation   Financial instruments  Public provision 




       
Market power  Price regulation 
Quality regulation 
-  Tendering 
       
External costs  (tradeable) Permits 
Environmental regulation 
Pigouvian taxes   
       




From the cells in the table above, we cluster the instruments in 4 groups, and use this clustering 
to discuss instruments and the associated government failure in the following sections. Most 
types of government failure apply to more than one type of instrument and are not necessarily 
limited to the section where they are discussed. The next section covers the use of subsidies and 
(universal) service obligations to ensure optimal outcomes, followed by a discussion on price 
and quality regulation aimed at mitigating the effects of market power. Section 4.4 discusses 
government instruments to handle external costs. Government instruments involving public 
 
7 PPP stands for Pubic-Private Partnership. See chapter 5 for more detail.   26 
provision are discussed in chapter 5. Like in the previous chapter, each section ends with a text 
box containing theoretical highlights and references. 
4.2  Subsidies and the universal service obligation 
Let us return to the base network (repeated below for convenience) and suppose the network is 
in place but needs expansion. Let us assume that the costs of expansion are lower than the total 
benefits to society. However, due to several types of market failure (public good and positive 
externalities, as described in the previous chapter), the total willingness to pay of all villagers is 
lower than the costs of expansion and hence expansion is not economically viable if looked at 
from the perspective of individual road owners. Given that the road is socially desirable, the 
government may subsidize capacity expansion, to persuade the road owners to expand the road. 
The amount of subsidy should exactly equal the value lost because of market failures to ensure 
optimal investment. Since it is difficult to assess the loss caused by market failure, it is difficult 
to determine the optimal amount of subsidy in practice. 







Instead of persuading road owners to expand their capacity, government may also oblige them 
to do so. Such a (universal) service obligation may seem costless at first glance, but it is not. A 
firm forced to engage in unprofitable activities may evade the obligation by going out of 
business, either voluntarily or because the firm becomes unprofitable altogether. In practice, 
governments often provide a reward to companies that they enforce a universal service 
obligation on. The governments in our villages may for instance guarantee to toll road owners 
that no parallel roads will be build for a number of years. They may also soften price constraints   27 
if any were in place. On a toll free road, a USO will probably be accompanied by a subsidy. 
Note that travellers, who have only one road to choose from, will eventually pay the price for 
the universal service obligation, meanwhile loosing welfare in the way we described in section 
3.3. 
More on financial instruments 
Subsidies are a fairly straightforward way to encourage producers to increase production or investment. Subsidies can 
lower the costs of an investment, resulting in a shift of the supply curve. It is a straightforward textbook case (e.g. 
Gruber,  2005,  p.  130)  to  show  that  a  subsidy  exactly  equal  to  a  positive  externality  will  render  a  socially  optimal 
outcome. 
 
The universal service obligation (USO) is well known and studied extensively in many network sectors, such as postal 
service,  electricity,  public  transport  and  telecommunications  (see  Cremer  et  al.,  2001  for  a  recent  overview).  The 
European Commission defines universal service as “the minimum set of services of specified quality to which all users 
and consumers have access in the light of specific national conditions, at an affordable price”
8. A universal service has, 
therefore, four main characteristics. First, from a societal perspective, these services are viewed as so essential that 
they must be made available to everyone. Second, the service must conform to certain quality standards. Third, it must 
be available to all users irrespective of location and financial means. Fourth, it must be affordable for everyone. (See De 
Bijl et al., 2003 and 2006, for some examples of designing a USO.) 
 
USO, or any other form of enforcement of production or investment, is very similar to subsidies in economic terms. At 
first sight, the costs are laid in the hand of the provider. In general however, this cost is compensated by granting the 
provider rights that enable the provider to engage in cross-subsidization (see e.g. Crandall and Waverman, 2000). This 
leads to suboptimal pricing elsewhere and therefore comes at a cost as well. 
 
4.3  Price and quality regulation 
In section 3.3, we discussed the possibility that market power may prevent the market from 
delivering the optimal outcome. Let us suppose the road is tolled and in order to prevent the 
abuse of market power, the government of the villages decides to regulate the price of road use. 
The government officials are also aware that the road owners use prices as a mechanism to 
manage demand peaks and spread traffic over the day. If the government were to enforce a 
fixed price, this mechanism would be lost, leading to underpricing and congestion in the peak 
and overpricing in off-peak periods.  
 
Instead, government officials choose to regulate the average price, so as to prevent overpricing 
because of market power, while leaving the road owner the opportunity to manipulate demand 
by time of day. The next choice they will have to make is whether they base the maximum price 
on current costs or on some historical level of prices or costs. The first type of price controls 
clearly gives an incentive to road owners to allow costs to increase, as this allows them to 
increase their prices as well. Using a historical level has the disadvantage that suboptimal 
 
8 Commission Communication on Services of General Interest in Europe, 2001, OJ C 17/4.   28 
pricing in the past is not corrected. To overcome these disadvantages, the government of the 
villages may look at (the lowest) prices charged for roads elsewhere and use it as a cost 
estimate. These may also be biased upwards of course, but if the number of other roads in the 
comparison is sufficiently large, this bias will not be very large. The type of price controls in 
which the price charged by each company depends on the performance of other companies is 
often referred to as ‘yardstick competition’, since it makes regulated companies virtually 




If a monopoly is unregulated, it will have the incentive to choose the price-to-quality ratio that 
maximises its profit in the long run. With price controls in place however, the road owner will 
still want to make a profit and starts cutting operational expenses. Government officials may be 
aware of that, but they may not feel the need to act because of their short time horizon. At the 
next election, they will be judged on their recent achievements, not on the future effect of their 
actions. 
 
Let us for now suppose that the government officials in the villages are very concerned with 
long run issues despite the risk that they may be voted out of office. Then they may want to 
impose quality regulation on road owners, to prevent them from cutting back on maintenance. 
They can either set standards or incorporate some kind of reward for quality levels in the price 
regulation system.  
 
The problem with both costs and quality is that they are hard to measure. In order to solve the 
measurement problem, the government of the villages hires specialists to gather the necessary 
information. These specialists maintain - by the nature of their activities - close contact with 
the regulated road owner. They may work for the road owner as well, or they may be former 
employees. This increases the (already large) risk that the road owner manipulates the 
information that the government uses for regulatory purposes. The road owner may even 
directly influence the specialists or the decisions of government officials through bribes or other 
favours. This may also take other forms. With the increase of industry knowledge, a specialist 
may become a bit too familiar with possible problems in the industry, allowing the road owner 
to exaggerate costs. This type of government failure is commonly known as regulatory capture. 
 
9 Obviously, one should take good care of unavoidable cost differences, such as differences caused by geography or 
climate. Otherwise, roads will be priced below cost price, which is also harmful for welfare.   29 
Regulation and possible government failure 
Price regulation such as restrictions on tolls would be a way to prevent excessive pricing by private owners. However, 
the task of the regulator is complicated by information asymmetry between the regulator and the firm. The problem of 
the regulator can be described as a Principal-Agent Problem, in which the Principal (regulator) has to induce a certain 
action of the Agent (regulated firm) under information constraints. The economic literature distinguishes two types of 
information  asymmetry:  moral  hazard  (the  effort  is  not  observable)  and  adverse  selection  (the  firm’s  type  is  not 
observable). The informational advantage of the firm implies that the regulator cannot achieve both: induce the highest 
effort and to extract all rents, but has to balance between these two objectives. See e.g. Chapter 1 in Laffont and Tirole 
(1993)  for  more  detail.  Regulation  schemes  that  put  more  weight  on  effort  inducement  are  called  ‘high  powered 
incentive schemes’, while the others are called ‘low powered’.  
 
In their ‘pure’ form, theoretical price regulation models can be divided into several classes: (i) cost-based regulation, 
which links the allowed revenues to the incurred costs in the same period, (ii) price- or revenue-cap regulation, under 
which prices are fixed en-ante, based on previous information on costs and forecasts about the future cost development 
(iii) yardstick competition, under which the regulator sets prices based on costs of other companies operating in similar 
conditions. Here the first class of models has low incentive power, and the other two classes feature high incentive 
power. In practice, however, price regulation often takes a hybrid form. 
 
A  price-regulated monopoly  can undersupply  quality,  which  affects  transportation speed  and safety.  (CPB/OCFEB, 
2004.) Quality standards, e.g. with respect to safety and design, can also be used to guarantee certain standard quality 
level of the roads. They can be complemented by economic incentives, which can be created by integration of price and 
quality regulation. The latter regulation forms were used recently by some regulators in other network industries (e.g. 
electricity). By setting the compensations for quality change at the social value of this change, the regulator internalises 
the  trade-off  between  cost  and quality  of  the service  provision. This  is  possible  as  long  as  quality  is contractible. 
However, the situation is more complex if quality is non-contractible. Laffont and Tirole (1991) analyse a regulation 
model with non-contractible quality. They distinguish between the case of a ‘search good’, in which quality can be 
observable to consumers so that their demand for a good to quality changes, and the case of an ‘experience good’, 
which quality can be observed only after buying the good. It appears that the search-good case is close to the situation 
with  contractible  quality.  There  high  powered  incentive  schemes  can  be  designed  in  such  a  way  that  prevents  a 
detrimental effect on quality, while this is not the case for an experience good. 
 
In addition to information asymmetry between the firm and the regulator, there are other factors that can limit the 
effectiveness of regulation. Short time horizons constitute a source for government failure. Some economists claim that 
politicians have a time horizon as short as the next elections (e.g. Wolf, 1978). Although this extreme stance is debated 
by other economists, some agreement and empirical evidence on the existence of political business cycles exists (e.g. 
Reid, 1998; Price, 1997). Another problem with government officials regulating industries is that of regulatory capture. 
These officials may be influenced (ranging from bribed to misinformed) by the industry in order to have them make 
decisions that are favourable to the industry. See Chapter 11 in Laffont and Tirole (1993) for an extensive overview of 
the literature, as well as a formal game theoretic model. 
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4.4  Internalization of external costs 
The government in our villages has several options to combat external effects. Pricing, the 
obvious solution in the eyes of an economist, is treated further on. Let us first return to the 
example of the farmer experiencing inconvenience from the road passing his farm (see section 
0).
10 Government may force road owners to build noise walls and a pedestrian bridge near his 
farm, or it may restrict capacity expansion near the farm, more or less forcing them to create a 
bypass when capacity expansion is required. 
Instruments to internalise external costs 
Environmental and safety norms can affect the design and location of the roads. For example, norms on noise, how far 
the road should be from the residential houses, safety norms and so on. Such norms may are likely to lower the private 
efficiency of the road owner and increase costs. This is likely because the road owner would have chosen the private 
optimum if left unrestricted. Any change imposed by rules is therefore a deviation from this optimum, but can improve 
total welfare, as long as the decrease in external costs outweighs the decrease in the road owner’s benefits (Lijesen et 
al., 2006) 
 
Since  the  geography  of  the  regions  changes  with  time  (new  construction  objects  being  built,  other  ones  being 
abandoned/moved,  etc.)  the  road  infrastructure  shape  changes  over  time.  As  it  would  be  too  costly  to  predict  all 
possible contingencies that may be relevant for the development of the road infrastructure in the future, the government 
needs to be able to intervene to secure that all social costs and benefits are taken into account.  
 
For instance, it may be necessary to protect certain areas (such as natural areas, etc.) or to direct the development of 
the infrastructure in the newly built area. This mainly concerns the stages when the road is conceived and designed. 
First, such an intervention can prevent building roads that bring more social welfare damage than benefits. Second, in 
case  it  is  still  optimal  to  have  the  road,  intervention  may  be  needed  to  prevent  private  parties  from  choosing  a 
suboptimal route or a cheaper construction model not taking into account the damage to the nature, or other social 
costs. These types of intervention bring about the risks that pressure groups will influence decision making, serving their 
own interest rather than that of the general public. 
 
There are already several experiences with variable tolls on the French toll roads in the 1990s. One of the rules applied 
is “no revenue increase”: e.g. higher tolls in peak hours have to be compensated with lower tolls in the off-peak. The first 
time-variable toll was introduced in 1992 on A1 to the North of Paris, implementing a toll increase in weekend rush 
hours, as well as a 25%-toll increase in certain (peak) hours of the day and 25%-decrease in the other hours. This 
variance in toll has succeeded to shift 10% of traffic to the off-peak. There are also environmental tolls (e.g. on the 
Alpine tunnel) and itinerary-variable tolls (on alternative routes from Paris to the Alps).  
 
 
10 In that specific case the road owner is the farmer himself, so let us suppose from now on that, at some point in time, he 
sold the road.   31 
More in general, the government of each of the villages may prohibit road construction or 
expansion near areas that are considered valuable by the public, whether it is residential, 
ecological or otherwise. This introduces the risk that pressure groups try to exaggerate the value 
of any area they find important, implying the risk that the protection of these areas will be 
overvalued in public decision making. 
 
An alternative option would be that the government of the villages imposes an environmental 
tax on the use of the road. Villagers will travel less, as the costs of travel have increased. At the 
same time, tax revenues may be used to compensate the farmer for the nuisance or to construct 
the measure that would otherwise have to be imposed upon road owners. 
Congestion pricing 
The primary reason for tolling is reducing congestions. The two important ‘products’ provided by the road are traffic 
volume (requiring capacity) and standard loading (requiring durability, or in the other words, ‘pavement thickness’), as 
formalised in Winston (1991). When the road infrastructure is free, road users disregard their contribution to congestion 
and damage of the infrastructure pavement (environmental impact being ignored for the time-being). Efficient pricing 
internalises these negative external costs that users impose on each other. 
 
Mohring and Harwitz (1962) showed that under certain assumptions the revenues from optimal congestion tolling can be 
covering the cost of optimal road capacity. These assumptions include constant returns to scale (CRS) for both road 
construction and road congestion. Newbery (1989) showed that if there are CRS in the road construction of roads with a 
given strength and CRS to road use then, even under increasing returns to scale (IRS) in strengthening the road, the 
optimal user will recover the total cost.  
 
In the Netherlands, the problem of road-pricing got attention in recent years. Verhoef et al. (2004) stress the generally 
low acceptance of the need for road pricing policy among Dutch drivers and policy makers. They investigate effects of 
switching  to  more  efficient  pricing  policy,  highlighting  the  important  implementation  issues.  The  question  whether 
congestion pricing will be cost-covering in the Netherlands has been left open. According to OC&C (2002), it is unlikely 
that toll-financing would be sufficient to cover the complete cost of most roads in the Netherlands, since the toll amount 
necessary would be typically at least tens percents of the integral cost of a car.
11  
 
Besides these main effects of congestion pricing there are also secondary effects, such as effect on labour supply. 
Parry et al. (1999) stresses that the way of recycling the tax revenue from congestion taxes for work-related traffic has 
an important welfare effect. If congestion tax revenues are used to reduce labour taxes the net impact on labour supply 
is positive, and the efficiency gain in the labour market can raise the overall welfare gains of the congestion tax by as 
much as 100 percent. Recycling congestion tax revenues in public transit subsidies produces a positive, but smaller, 
impact on labour supply. 
 
 
11 The complete quote in Dutch reads: “Gegeven typische verkeersdichtheden is het echter zeldzaam dat uit tolopbrengsten 
een weg geheel kan worden gefinancierd (ten indicatie: noodzakelijk tarief minstens tientallen procenten van de integrale 
kosten van een auto!)” (OC&C, 2002, p.23).   32 
As we have seen earlier, congestion is a special case. Road users impose external costs on each 
other rather than on others. Looked at the perspective of all road users, this cost is therefore not 
external. This opens the possibility to let the road owner solve congestion through the price 
mechanism. It is optimal for the road owner to reduce congestion as much as possible, as the 
villagers will be willing to pay more for road use if the road is uncongested.   33 
5  Public roads versus private roads 
5.1  Introduction 
This chapter takes the involvement of the government of the villages in road infrastructure yet 
another step further. In chapter 4 we limited the role of government to interventions in private 
decisions, in this chapter we expand the role of government to ownership and production, either 
by itself or in conjunction with private parties. Section 5.2 discusses public production of roads, 
followed by a discussion of procurement. In the final section, the focus lies on public-private 
partnerships (PPPs). This section also focuses on the production chain. 
5.2  Public production 
Let us now return to the example used earlier. Suppose that the villagers have decided that 
market failures are so severe that government should step in, and suppose they choose the 
option of public provision. In our example a road already exists, so government buys the road 
from its owners and is from now on responsible for capacity decisions, as well as for the entire 
DBFO-chain. Let us assume that roads are financed through taxes that are not directly related to 
road use. Does this solve the problems associated with the public good market failure we 
mentioned in section 3.2? Provided that the government in our example has sufficient 
information on road users’ preferences, it will provide the optimal level of roads. In this sense, 
both the public good problem and the network externalities problems are solved. A well-
informed government will take the spillovers into account as well. Note however that this only 
solves a part of the problem, as the villagers will still be able to use the road for free and will 
therefore generate more trips than would be socially optimal.
12 
 
However, public production is associated with government failure (see the box at the end of this 
section). A road authority is installed to plan and manage the roads between the villages. The 
chief of this organisation is likely to expand his organisation, as this increases his power and 
prestige, and probably also his salary. Once several inefficient mechanisms come in place in his 
organisation, he is bound to leave them as is, since the reward for removing them is zero, 
whereas removing the inefficiency may cause him quite some trouble. In a well-functioning 
market, this type of inefficiency - labelled X-inefficiencies - are punished by customers 
switching to less expensive suppliers, eventually leading to bankruptcy of the inefficient 
supplier. In the case of government-provide roads, there is no such thing as customers 
switching, clearly reducing the incentive to raise efficiency. 
 
 
12 Remember from section 3.2 that transaction costs of road pricing are assumed to be prohibitively high. If this assumption 
is relaxed, the public good argument disappears altogether.   34 
The money needed for infrastructure investment is collected through taxes. These taxes affect 
prices elsewhere in the economy of the villages, and therefore distort market outcomes. These 
distortions are the costs of public funds, discussed in section 4.2 before. 
 








Suppose that the government has owned the road for some time now, and all goes reasonably 
well. The villages have grown over time, as have traffic volumes and road capacity is becoming 
tight. At this point, politicians will have to decide whether and how to expand road capacity. 
The Local Motorists Association starts a frantic lobby to convince politicians to build a new, 
direct road (dashed line in figure 5.1) rather than expanding the old one. The lobby may 
convince the politicians, even if it is not in the general interest to build the new road. This is 
similar to the influence of environmental pressure groups, discussed in section 4.4. 
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More on public production and potential government failure 
Public production solves a great deal of the problems caused by market failure. Provided that the government is 
benevolent and omniscient, it can produce public goods in optimal quantities, it will not abuse (but still have) market 
power and it will take into account positive and negative externalities when taking decisions. Furthermore, but beyond 
the scope of this study, governments will take into account distributional effects of their decisions. These appealing 
characteristics may explain why economists in the 1930s and 1940s were fairly optimistic about government ownership 
and public production. 
 
From the economic theory perspective, as long as quality is contractible, both private parties and government 
organisations should be equally able to deliver public good. However, the outcome may be different when quality or 
some aspects of it are not contractible. Hart et al. (1997) address the problem if the government should provide service 
itself or outsource it to private parties in such a case. They consider two types of incentives: those to reduce cost and to 
improve (not-contractible) quality. When assets are publicly-owned, the public manager has relatively weak incentives to 
make either of these investments. In contrast, these incentives are strong under private ownership, which is why, 
“private ownership should generally be preferred to government ownership when incentives to innovate and contain cost 
must be strong” (as stressed by Shleifer, 1998).  
 
Since a private party has a stronger incentive to save cost, while cost reductions may affect non-contractible quality, 
there are also situations when government ownership is likely to be superior. In particular, Shleifer (1998) points the 
following situations: (i) significant opportunities for cost reductions lead to non-contractible deterioration of quality; (ii) 
innovations are relatively unimportant; (iii) competition is weak and consumer choice is ineffective; (iv) reputational 
mechanisms are also weak. In other situations, the case for private provision is strong. The possibility of provision by 
private non-profit firms and the inclusion of political considerations, such as political patronage and corruption, make the 
case of private provision even stronger. 
 
Empirical literature on the effect of ownership on companies’ performance generally supports the latter claim. For 
example, this conclusion can be drawn based on the review by Megginson and Netter (2001) of the findings of 22 
empirical studies that analyse the effect of privatisation in different countries and industries. In this studies efficiency 
improved after privatisation, or in some cases, even anticipation of privatisation has had a positive effect on efficiency. 
They found only one study (concerning British companies), where this was not the case. 
 
5.3  Procurement 
Now that the villagers have found out that public production is quite an expensive way to build 
roads, they start searching for ways to cut on spending. Since the villagers want to retain the 
advantage of public production, to cure almost any market failure, they do not want to abolish 
public influence altogether, but begin evaluating outsourcing possibilities along the DBFO-
chain for the best place to decrease X-inefficiency. Actual construction (Build in de DBFO-
chain), where the bulk of the expenditures are located, is the most obvious candidate. 
 
By handing out the construction activity to the private sector, the villagers got rid of a large part 
of the X-inefficiency that accompanied public production. The villagers, experienced as they 
had become with market power issues, decided to procure the building stage through tendering. 
This way, firms will have to compete to get the assignment, thus reducing market power. 
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Enthusiastic as they have became by the large gains in efficiency through procurement, the 
villagers start thinking about and experimenting with the procurement of other links in the 
DBFO-chain. They find that any part of the chain may be outsourced, but some parts are more 
vulnerable to the return of market failure than others. This is mainly driven by the 
contractibility of activities, as defined in the box below. 
 
After some time of relative quietness, the local newspaper reveals that a civil servant was 
caught red-handed receiving bribes from one of the companies bidding for a tender. This is a 
clear example of another possible government failure, corruption. Although the likeliness of 
corruption differs greatly between cultures and regions, it is generally the case that an increase 
in the stakes increases the risk of foul play. 
More on procurement issues 
 
The government can limit market power by a proper design of a procurement auction or tendering procedure (see 
Klemperer (2002) for an overview). Nowadays, especially in developing countries, many governments auction highway 
franchises to the private sector. In these auctions the regulator usually fixes the length of franchise (usually 20-30 years) 
and firms bid on the toll. The lowest bidder gets the project. However, experiences of different countries show that there 
are problems with using this mechanism, such as the frequent use of government guarantees reducing incentives to 
control construction costs and government bailouts for franchises that face financial trouble. Engel et al. (1997) argue 
that many of the problems stem from the fact that franchises are typically awarded for a fixed period, the length of which 
does not depend on demand realisations. They propose a new auction mechanism, where the regulator sets the toll 
schedule and the firm that bids the least present value of toll revenue wins the franchise. Assuming that the regulator is 
not allowed to make transfers to the franchise holder, and that firms are unable to diversify risk completely, they show 
that optimal contracts are achieved by using least-present-value-of-revenue auctions. 
 
Ades and Di Tella (1997) develop a model showing that active government intervention (in their case: industry policy) is 
likely to promote corruption. They test their model empirically and find a significant effect of corruption on investments. 
Ades and Di Tella (1999) find that corruption is higher in economies where competition is weak.  
 
5.4  Public-private partnerships 
Having gained the knowledge that not every activity in the DBFO-chain can easily be 
contracted, the villagers conclude that they somehow should find an optimal mix between 
public and private. They are aware that some of the activities in the chain are linked, or may 
achieve higher efficiency when linked. For instance, if construction and maintenance are in the 
same hands, optimal decisions will be made on investments that save on maintenance in the 
future. The downside of allocating both these activities to the same party would be that the road 
owner can increase the information asymmetry and thus earn information rents. This leads to 
the view that the public and the private sector should not divide the DBFO-chain, but that they 
may be better of operating (parts of) the chain together. This type of cooperation is known as 
public-private partnership (PPP). Appendix A lists the most important types of public-private 
partnerships.   37 
Traditional procurement versus PPP 
The paper by Hart et al. (1997) evaluates public and private ownership forms in general, but does not distinguish 
between different organisational forms that are feasible for multistage projects, such as road infrastructure provision. In 
the other words, it does not explain the existence of PPP constructions, under which the government lets a private party 
to build the asset, transfers it to public ownership and leases it back to the same private party to operate. Why it is 
sometimes important that the same agent both builds and operates the asset? 
Hart  (2003)  develops  a model  that  distinguishes  conventional  provision, in  which  the  government contracts  with  a 
builder to build the facility, and then later on with another private party to run it, from a PPP organisation, in which both 
stages are bundled. In their model, the builder makes investment, which reduces costs and affects quality at the second 
stage  positively  (productive  investment)  or  negatively  (unproductive  investment).  Both  types  of  investment  are 
observable to the party that will run the facility, but they cannot be verified and, therefore, cannot be included in the 
contract with the builder. The outcome of the model is that under PPP, the builder does more of both productive as well 
as unproductive investment, than under unbundling. This implies that conventional provision is good if the quality of the 
building can be well specified, whereas the quality of the service can not be. In contrast, PPP is good if the quality of the 
service can be well specified in the initial contract, whereas the quality of the building can not be. 
Bentz et al. (2005) suggest a complementary model to evaluate the relevance of PPPs. In their model, the investment of 
the builder, which is his private information, enhances the quality of the asset. At the operation stage, the operation cost 
can be high or low, and this is private information to the service provider. There is also one off set-up cost at the 
operating  stage,  which  is  initially  private  information  to  the  government.  Bentz  et  al.  obtain  that  when  the  quality 
enhancing  costs  are  small,  the optimal  investment  in the  case  of  a  PPP  comes  without  extra  payments  from the 
government to the operator to reveal operation costs. But if these costs are large, then the government can only trigger 
these investments by substantially increasing the payment in the ‘revelation mechanism’. They conclude that PPPs are 
the optimal mode of service delivery when quality-enhancing investments at the build stage are relatively cheap and the 
set  up  costs  at  the  service  provision  stage  are  low.  In  contrast,  when  these  costs  are  high  then  conventional 
procurement is either optimal or at least as good as PPPs. 
Bartelsman et al. (1998) define PPP as cooperation between the government and a private firm in which both parties 
have mutual financial interest in a project. They stress that PPP should be applied when it can increase the social return 
of the project by tacking between market and government failures. Canoy et al. (2001) underscore that risk sharing 
arrangements within PPP provide an instrument to reduce the moral hazard problem and create incentives for both 
parties to increase efficiency of the project. A recent contribution by Engel et al. (2006) analyses road ownership and 
financing options. They conclude that if private sector is more efficient, concessions for a self-financing road should be 
fully private, but for a limited term. However, if private sector is more efficient but the road does not pay its way, i.e. 
requires government subsidies, an indefinite (very long) PPP is optimal.  
The role of the government has been rethought in recent years (see e.g. Shleifer, 1998), giving the private sector more 
room  in  the  provision  of  goods  and  services  that  used  to  be  delivered  by  the  government.  New  forms  of  private 
participation relieve tight public budgets, reduce the costs of public funds and increase efficiency. However they are also 
not fully free from government failure. While most PPP-literature focuses on private party incentives, Maskin and Tirole 
(2006) analyse failure on the government side. When comparing a PPP with a simple (unbundled) situation, they show 
that unbundling can decrease welfare because it prevents early assessment of projects’ costs, while PPPs increase 
transparency of public accounts. This benefit however comes together with costs: bundling may make intertemporal 
transfer possible. Therefore, officials may choose for a PPP, instead of simple unbundled contracts, in attempts to 
evade budget constraints, which they would face otherwise. A PPP contract allows contractors to mask the true cost of 
the project (in the beginning) to shift rents to later stages of the project (the so called ‘rent backloading’). This can be 
done  by  strategically  increasing  incompleteness  of  contracts,  which  allows  contractors  to  accept  a  lower  payment 
initially, to have higher rents at the later stages. Such shifting does not occur in the case of unbundled contracts, 
because the party that builds the asset cannot appropriate rents arising at the service delivery stage. The authors stress 
the necessity of reviews of PPP contracts by independent authorities.   38 
An important issue in establishing a public-private partnership is the distribution of risks over 
the partners. A wide variety of risk sharing may be found in existing PPPs, and the issue has an 
important impact on the outcomes of a PPP, as will become clear in the next chapter.   39 
6  Case studies 
6.1  Introduction  
In order to illustrate the work of different instruments we include three case studies in our 
analysis. As said, many countries recently experienced a shift from more intensive forms of 
government intervention in road provision (such as fully-public provision and operation of road 
infrastructure) towards less intensive forms (such as PPPs and private provision). Therefore, we 
have chosen case studies corresponding to such new forms of provision. Two of these case 
studies, Road A59 (section 6.2) and Wijkertunnel (section 6.3), address recent experiences in 
the Netherlands. The third study (section 6.4), presents the case of a privately-provided road in 
the US. 
 
The case studies aim to illustrate the work of different government instruments that can be used 
to solve one or another type of market failure in road infrastructure provision. An important 
feature of the selected projects that they cover several phases of the DBFM-chain, in particular 
the phases of building and operation, which make these cases especially interesting.  
  
Table 6.1  Summary of differences between the case studies 
  A-59  Wijkertunnel  SR-91 
       
Type of infrastructure  Upgrading a short piece of the existing 
road 
A new tunnel  New express lanes along a 
busy route 
       
Type of project  PPP  PPP  Private concession initially, 
later replaced by public 
ownership 
       
Type of payment 
mechanism 
Zero toll for the users, availability 
payment by the public sector 
Shadow toll per 
car 
Free toll (set by the private 
owner) 
       
Type of price regulation  Availability payment; it is reduced when 
less lanes are available  
Tolls are fixed in 
the  contract  
No 
 
   
  We have selected cases that differ in the type of infrastructure, degree of government 
intervention, type of payment mechanism and type of price regulation (as summarized in Table 





13 There were some other potentially interesting cases, which we considered in the process of case selection for this report, 
including in particular Autopista Central in Chili (concessions and tolls in city areas), Westerscheldetunnel in the Netherlands 
(publicly owned toll concession), France motorways (toll concessions, privatization); tunnels and crossings in the UK 
(concessions with toll-financing) and Swedish low-volume roads (government subsidies and local ownership). We refer to 
relevant experiences on different occasions in this report. See boxes in chapters 4-5.    40 
6.2  A59 in the Netherlands 
This case study discusses one of the first Dutch experiences with the use of PPP forms in road 
provision. We start with giving some background information on this road in section 6.2.1, after 
which we discuss the contractual arrangements in section 6.2.2, followed by the analysis of the 
potential market failures for this case and their solutions in section 6.2.3. 
6.2.1  Background 
A59 is the road that replaces the old road N59 between Rosmalen and Geffen, which used to be 
a bottleneck of the connection between ‘s-Hertogenbosch and Nijmegen. It is a relatively short 
piece of 9,1 km (with the speed limit of 100-km/h). It is the first road in the Netherlands built 
under PPP.
14 The DBFM form has been chosen.  
 
The discussion about the reconstruction of N59 started already in 1989, but no priority was 
given to this project, because of lack of financial means under the Ministry’s budget constraint. 
After some delay, state financing for this project was finally reserved for 2007-2010. However, 
in 1999 the province Noord-Brabant suggested that this project could start before 2007 as a 
PPP. Hence, the use of a PPP relieved the temporary financing constraint. 
 
The use of the tendering procedure in the contractor-selection process helped to curb potential 
market power. The selection process went as follows. There were in total 59 parties (organized 
in 7 consortia) that suggested themselves for selection, of which five were selected to 
participate in bidding. The Private-Public-Comparator test was performed, in which the total 
project cost was compared to the cost in the case of usual tendering of project parts to different 
parties (the latter is called a Public Sector Comparator). The government had also to increase 
the budgetary amounts to be paid for this road, as the initial budget appeared too small. Two 
consortia were selected to participate in negotiation, one of which later was dropped as 
unsatisfying to the requirements on the side of the province. The final remaining bid was 14% 
under the Public Sector Comparator (Deloitte, 2003). 
6.2.2  Project organization and financing 
This PPP-project is a DBFM between a private party, the consortium Poort van Den Bosch, and 
public parties, municipalities and the province Noord-Brabant. The consortium designs, builds, 
maintains and manages the road until 2020. The length of the contract is 18 years. The 
construction had to be completed in 2005, after which the province pays to the consortium each 
year the so-called ‘availability-payment’ for this road, while the consortium does the road 
maintenance and management.  
 
 
14 According to the project report on http://www.infrasite.nl.   41 
The initial investment was done by the consortia ‘Poort den Bosch’, financed by bank loans, 
and later compensated by payments of the public parties participating in the PPP.  
 
The total cost of the project is 218 mln euros
15, 195 mln of which are paid by the Dutch 
Transport Ministry, MVW. This is transferred during 18 years in annual amounts to the 
province, which is in charge for payments to the consortium. The rest is split between the 
province (the province paid these 11,5 mln) and the group of several municipalities (11,5 mln: 
4,5 are paid in the construction phase, and the rest later). The payment to ‘Poort van Den 
Bosch’ is spread into quarterly amounts: larger compensations begin only upon the road 
completion. 
 
The contract includes fines for not meeting certain quality requirements (e.g. some safety 
norms), as well as fines for unavailability of lanes (e.g. because of maintenance), varying 
depending on the severity of the hinder to the traffic (e.g. higher fines in peak-hours). 
Since the payment is not per product delivered in each phase of the project but for the service 
that is offered, there are incentives for the private party to optimize the relations within the 
chain: between construction expenses and maintenance expenses, as well as between 
maintenance and operation expenses, etc.  
 
In the contract, risks associated with the national-wide law and regulation changes are allocated 
to the Ministry. The risks associated with uncertainty in local situation (local regulations, delays 
because of local problems: protests, environmental protection, etc), rent fluctuation and large 
damage to the third parties are borne by the province, while the project risks (such as design, 
construction, maintenance and management risks) and risks of smaller damages to third parties 
are allocated to the consortium. 
6.2.3  Discussion of market failures and solutions 
This section links the situation observed in this case to the general theory on market failures in 
road provision and policy instruments offering solutions, which we discussed in the previous 
chapters. This project mainly illustrates solutions to market failures that relate to public good 
and market power.  
 
In the case of A-59, we are not dealing with a new road construction, but with an upgrade of an 
existing road. Since it is simply a 10-km piece of an existing free-access road, not a tunnel or a 
crossing where the introduction of limited access is easier both politically and technically, non-
excludability is an issue here. This public-good feature of this project is responsible for market 
failure, because of which the market itself would not deliver this road. Besides, market parties 
 
15 Source: http://www.infrasite.nl.   42 
would not consider positive spillovers from the road infrastructure for the economy.
16 
Therefore, government intervention was needed to initiate this project. 
 
Market power could potentially have been a problem in this case (despite no real toll), as the 
government had to select one party as a contractor. However, as we know from theory, this 
problem could be solved by introducing ‘competition for the market’ at the selection stage and 
by a proper allocation of risks between the state and the private contractor. A necessary 
condition in order to introduce competition is that there should be several parties qualified to 
compete for this project, which was the case here (see section 6.2.1). The use of a PPP-form 
allowed for ascribing the risks in such a way that if one party was in a better position to carry a 
certain risk, then this risk was allocated to this party. For example, the government was carrying 
risks related to the local situation and legislation, while the private contractor, who had an 
informational advantage regarding construction and operation risks and trade-offs, was also the 
carrier of these risks. Letting the (same) private party to construct and to operate the facility 
internalizes the externality with respect to quality enhancing investment in the building stage. 
The theoretical literature (see Hart, 2003)
17 supports the use of a PPP if the quality of service is 
easier to specify than the quality of the asset, which seems to be the case here.  
In this project, the private party does not collect tolls, but receives ‘availability payment’ from 
the state. This availability payment is unrelated to traffic volumes. In such a way, the private 
party does not face the potential insolvency risks because of price and volume fluctuations, and 
at the same time it is unable to exploit such fluctuations to make excessive rents. In addition, 
this payment scheme provides the private contractor with the incentive to perform the 
maintenance with minimal traffic disruptions. 
The downside of having the availability payment instead of user fees is that the road operator 
does not have an incentive to internalize congestion externalities efficiently. As explained in the 
theoretical chapter, adding more capacity to the road solves congestion issues in the short run, 
but not in the long run. The increased free capacity of the road usually attracts more demand. 
Since road use has not been priced efficiently, demand growth is likely to outpace the capacity 
level, increasing future congestion externalities. However, since this A-59 road extension 
represents a regular piece of a road, not a special infrastructure item as for example a tunnel or a 
crossing, transaction costs (including technical, legal and political costs) of limiting access to 
this particular piece of infrastructure would be relatively high. Therefore, a separate tolling on 
this peace of road is unlikely to be a good option. Besides, introducing tolls on this short piece 
of road may distort the traffic allocation, diverting too much traffic to free roads. Therefore, 
 
16 Negative (environmental) external effects are of a less issue in this case, because here we deal with a road improvement, 
not with a completely new road.  
17 See the box ‘Traditional procurement versus PPP’ in section 0   43 
more comprehensive measures (including tolling other roads) may need to be considered as a 
solution to potential congestion issues on this route.  
6.3  Wijkertunnel in the Netherlands 
This case study addresses the contractual arrangements for the Wijkertunnel and highlights 
market power issues in road provision. We first describe the Wijkertunnel facility and the 
project organization in section 6.3.1, followed by the discussion of both market and government 
failure issues and policy instruments to curb them in section 6.3.2. 
6.3.1  Background and project organization 
The Wijkertunnel is a tunnel under the North Sea Canal near Amsterdam. It has been build in 
order to reduce the traffic load on the Velsertunnel. The construction work took three years, 
after which the tunnel was opened in 1996. The construction cost was about 600 mln dfl (272 
mln euro). 
 
It is one of the first PPPs in the Netherlands. Three quarters of construction cost, 480 mln, were 
paid by the consortium of banks and insurers (including ING Bank, Nationale Nederlanden and 
the Commerzbank). This had to be compensated by the ‘shadow toll’, which will be paid by the 
Dutch Government over the period of 30 years, after which this tunnel will be transferred to the 
state at the symbolic amount of 1 dfl.
18  
 
The shadow toll amount is set per car, therefore the payment of the state for this tunnel is 
sensitive for traffic volumes. The resulting risk is somewhat reduced by including in the 
contract the provision of a lower shadow tolls when the traffic increases significantly. The 
National General Accounting Office (Algemene Rekenkamer) argued that the estimates of the 
cost of this project for the state were very sensitive to computational assumptions (e.g., volume 
development and inflation rate), and that it was very likely that the government would 
eventually overpay for this project. They estimated that the government might eventually spend 
more on this tunnel than if the tunnel would be provided by the state
19 (AR, 1993). 
6.3.2  Market failure, government failure, solutions 
In contrast to the previous case (section 6.2), market power represents the most important issue 
here, while public-good features did not play a role. 
 
18 See ‘Toespraak van de minister van Verkeer en Waterstaat mevr. A. Jorritsma-Lebbink bij de opening van de Wijkertunnel 
op donderdag 11 juli (1996) te Velzen’, http://www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl. 
19 “De Rekenkamer heeft berekend dat - in nog veel sterkere mate dan bij de Noordtunnelovereenkomst - de prijs van 
private financiering op basis van de door haar gehanteerde uitgangspunten aanzienlijk hoger is dan het geval zou zijn 
geweest als het Rijk zelf zou financieren en exploiteren...” (AR, 1993). See also NRC (1998), 
http://www.nrc.nl/W2/Lab/Profiel/Infrastructuur/reveil.html.   44 
Non-excludability is generally not an issue for tunnels, bridges and crossings, where limited 
access is relatively easy to arrange. As problems related to this public good feature are easy to 
curb, the market should be able to provide such a road as long as there is a sufficient number of 
users who want to use the facility. However, under restrictive land policy of the state, the 
acquisition of the land may cause an impediment for private parties to undertake such a project. 
As soon as the state lets a private provider use the land, the private sector would probably be 
willing to provide the road. 
 
Letting a private party provide the road gives rise to concerns about market power. This case 
study illustrates that the market power problem in road provision can be very large. It began to 
manifest from the very beginning of the project. In contrast to the case of A-59 considered in 
section 6.2, where several parties competed to carry on the project, there was one party that had 
a special construction experience in this area. In particular, this party had earlier developed a 
similar tunnel. As a result, this party had a large advantage compared to competitors and also a 
large informational advantage compared to the public party in the PPP (van Bommel et al., 
2003). This demonstrates the danger of introducing competition for the market when there are 
not enough competitors. Perhaps, a more competitive situation could have been achieved if 
competition for the market had began at the ‘conceiving phase’ of the project, i.e. in the phase 
in which it was decided what kind of infrastructure should be build to facilitate the connection. 
In such a case several different infrastructure projects could have potentially competed with 
each other, which would have decreased their individual market power.  
 
From theory, we know that governments often take a somewhat short perspective in their 
decisions (see e.g. Wolf, 1978, and Grier et al., 2000). Also here, a ‘short-term budget solution’ 
was chosen, “because there was no money for the tunnel at the beginning of the project.”
20 The 
project went on, despite the pessimistic evaluations of the net value of such a contract for the 
state by the National General Accounting Office. This case study illustrates the danger of ‘back 
loading’ under government budget caps (Maskin and Tirole, 2006).
21  
 
The contractual arrangements contributed to increasing private monopoly rents. In the 
construction phase, the state carried risks associated with the foregone interest as the result of 
the delay of the construction (AR, 1993), which increased the bargaining power of the private 
party even more. Furthermore, the government has set the price (shadow toll) per road user, 
 
20 Nijkamp and Ubbels, 1998, p.8. Additionally, Nijkamp and Ubbels argue that the initial estimates of the cost of this project 
were not reliable at all. These estimates were made in October 1988 and revised in just two months after that, with a 
substantial increase. This second estimate was 152 mln gulden higher than the initial estimate and relatively close to the 
actual cost. The reasons for the increase compared to the initial estimate that were given by the Regional Board of 
Rijkswaterstaat were: ‘the solitary construction instead of a tunnel stream, a different way of construction, the higher cost for 
the road section and extensions such as traffic signaling and new technical equipment’, which illustrates that the first 
estimation was very global. 
21 See the box ‘Traditional procurement versus PPP’ in section 5.   45 
letting the payment to the private party depend on the traffic volume. As the actual volume 
outperformed the forecast, the government is paying too much to the private contractor
22 (even 
though this effect was dampened by making the ‘shadow toll’ dependent on significant 
increases of the traffic volume). The theoretical literature recognizes problems associated with 
fixing the franchise length irrespectively of demand realizations. In particular, Engel et al. 
(1997) argues for the use of the least present value auction as the most efficient mechanism for 
road-concession procurement (see the box ‘More on ownership and procurement issues’ in 
section 5).  
Road financing in the UK
23 
In the UK, private finance initiatives launched in 1992. Unlikely many other countries, the UK mainly use shadow tolls: 
i.e. private contractors provide the road (parts of it) and receive a payment based on traffic flow and a notional toll. 
These contracts with private contractors are managed by Highways Agency. DBFO-contracting forms are used for many 
roads. Such forms transfer the responsibility for the road to private contractor, which allows the government to balance 
incentives for better construction quality in order to reduce the maintenance cost. On the positive side, public good and 
market  power  problems  get  solved.  On  the  negative  side,  shadow  tolls  do  not  encourage  efficient  use  of  the 
infrastructure by the road-users. 
 
For  some  principal crossings,  toll-concessions  are  used.  Instead of  fixed  period  concessions, the  UK mainly  uses 
concessions that run until the capital cost of the new infrastructure is amortized up to maximum life, usually 20 years. 
The  toll  undertakings  thus  generally  cannot  raise  tolls  to make  extra  profit.  Here  again,  the system  is  effective  in 
deterring market power abuse.  
 
Dartford crossings represent an example of a project with a clear monopoly situation, in which the private sector has 
been  able  to  provide  the infrastructure  profitably. The  Dartford crossings  were  provided  under  maximum  20  years 
franchises and the operator has been able to amortize the capital cost and transfer the infrastructure to the public sector 
in less than two-thirds of the expected time (in 2003). Hence, market failure associated with monopoly provision was 
mitigated by the concession rules not allowing making profits. 
 
 
The UK experience with road provision, described in the box ‘Road financing in the UK’ 
included in this section, is useful in this respect. In the UK, the contracts are designed in such a 
way that the profits of the private provider are capped and cannot largely exceed the costs 
because of mistakes in traffic volume forecasts. Instead of fixed period concessions, the UK 
mainly uses concessions that run until the capital cost of the new infrastructure is amortized up 
to maximum life, usually 20 years. On the one hand, this ensures that the private party only 
undertakes the project if it expects the ‘social value’ of the project (expressed as the shadow toll 
amount multiplied by demand for this facility) to be above the private costs. On the other hand, 
this eliminates the possibility of excessive private rents.  
 
22 Bruinsma et al. (1999) 
23 Sources: http://www.dft.gov.uk/stellent/groups/dft_roads/documents/pdf/dft_roads_pdf_029710.pdf and Vickerman 
(2004a, b).   46 
With respect to congestion issues, we notice that shadow tolls (as well as real tolls that do not 
reflect congestion externalities) do not solve these issues efficiently. Since the road users are 
not confronted with the true cost of this externality, they tend to ‘over-consume’, i.e. to use the 
tunnel not in the way that would be efficient, not counting for the congestion costs imposed on 
the other users. 
6.4  SR-91 in the US, California 
The California State Road 91 (SR-91) express way was one of the few private franchises in the 
US, which has been bought back by the public authority. The experience with this road 
highlights possible dangerous effects that arise because of contractual incompleteness. Another 
important issue raised in this example is the potential inefficiency of the coexistence of toll 
roads and free roads. As stressed by Vickerman (2004a), tolls tend to produce free traffic flow 
on the tolled route with congestion remaining on the parallel untolled route and thus an 
inefficient allocation of the road space. On the positive side, the experience from this road 
shows the innovative ability of the private party in solving congestions by using time-varying 
tolls. In this section, we first give some background information on SR-91 in section 6.4.1, and 
then proceed with the discussion of the main lessons from this case study in section 6.4.2. 
6.4.1  Background and project organization 
SR-91 connects Riverside and Orange County in California. It is a major limited-access (toll) 
express way, heavily used by commuters. The road was one of few privately built and operated 
roads in the US. It was one of the first candidates for franchising under the new US law 
allowing a limited number of highway franchises. The new legislation has set certain 
restrictions on private franchises: profits from franchises were limited by predetermined rates of 
return, and private highways had to obey standard environmental requirements and laws, but 
there were no other restrictions on tolls, project specification, design, financing and operation.  
 
The Orange County Transportation Authority (OCTA) had planned to build high-occupancy 
lanes in the median of the existing highways, but public funds were insufficient. Therefore, the 
California Private Transportation Company, a limited partnership formed by subsidiaries of 
several corporations, proposed to introduce private lanes for the median of SR-91. In 1990 a 35-
year franchise was awarded; and in 1995 private lanes were opened. The lanes were innovative 
in many respects, implementing electronically collected tolls and congestion pricing. Toll rates 
were not regulated except that limits were set on the rate of return. Toll revenues were high 
enough to recover costs. 
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The congestion pricing mechanism implemented on SR-91 discriminates between direction and 
day of week in one-hour time periods. This impressive innovation in toll pricing eliminated 
congestions on these lanes. 
 
Although initially the road was seen as a pure net benefit (solving several market failures, such 
as public good and congestion, and having a positive spill-over effect), the public opinion 
changed by the end of the 90s, when the California Department of Transportation wanted to add 
more lanes (between the free lanes and the new private lanes).  
 
The original franchise on SR-91 contained a ‘non-compete’ clause, which precluded the public 
authority to develop road capacity which could abstract the traffic on the private toll lanes. This 
clause was included, because it was considered to be essential to ensure that the private 
investment would not face unanticipated competition. Safety reasons could override this clause. 
However, despite the need of new lanes was partly motivated by safety concerns (the accident 
rate grew), the public authority did not manage to justify this safety needs indisputably (Boarnet 
et al., 2004). 
 
The problem was solved only in 2003, when the Orange County Transportation Authority 
bought
24 the toll lanes from the private owners to remove this rule. The purchase of the road by 
the public authority cleared the way for enhancing the Riverside freeway corridor to increase 
the capacity of traffic flow. The efficient investment in the road expansion has been carried out. 
The congestion pricing scheme that was implemented on the tolled lanes initially is still in 
place.
25  
6.4.2  Discussion of market failures and solutions 
This case illustrates on one hand, the danger of giving too much freedom to a private party 
under uncertainty, potentially leading to market power. On the other hand, the experience from 
this road shows the innovative ability of the private party in solving congestions by using time-
varying tolls. 
Market power  
The road has been introduced as a limited access road along a very busy route. Public good 
problems did not play a role. The possibility to collect tolls to cover the investment was present; 
hence there was a private party who was ready to provide the road. But the danger of market 
power was underestimated when including a ‘non-compete’ clause in the contract with the 
private provider.  
 
24 For 207.5 mln dollars. 
25 Motorists who would like to use this road must set up a financial account and carry an electronic transponder to pay a toll, 
which varies hourly according to fixed schedule. Carpools of three or more get a 50% discount. The congestion pricing 
mechanism used on this road discriminates between directions and days of week in one-hour time periods.   48 
As discussed in the theoretical chapter, governments tend to underestimate risks associated with 
uncertainties. This short-sighted behavior can be a reason for government failure in provision of 
long-lasting infrastructure such as roads. When granting the concession, the Californian 
authority was more concerned about the possibility of having the road in the near future than 
about the risk related to the capacity constraint until the end of the concession. This resulted 
that when the traffic volume increased, the authority (or better to say, the society represented by 
this authority) had to pay for this contractual flaw.  
 
In this case the prices were unregulated. By the inclusion of a ‘non-compete clause’ in the 
contract, the Californian authority committed not to expand road capacity, hence, securing 
traffic volume for the private contractor. This gave the private party market power (toll 
discretion and the possibility of rationing the traffic to maximize profit). Time has shown that 
the monopoly provider exploited this flaw in the contractual design. 
 
The experience from SR-91 highlights the problems of incomplete contracting between private 
and public parties, when unexpected circumstances arise. In particular, Boarnet et al. (2004) 
stresses the danger of letting too much discretion to private parties and argues for public-private 
partnership in highway provision.  
Congestion externalities 
While the congestion pricing mechanisms implemented on SR-91 eliminated the congestions on 
these express lanes, it did not solve congestion problems in the region efficiently. The economic 
literature on the effect of the pricing policies adopted on this road suggests that the coexistence 
of parallel free and toll lanes is inefficient. The literature offers pricing schemes that can 
improve the efficiency of traffic allocation. 
 
Small and Yan (2001) show that the effect of the introduction of tolls depends on assumptions 
on the road user heterogeneity. In particular, the performance of such policies generally 
improves, if the assumption of user homogeneity is replaced by the assumption of 
heterogeneous users. However, for a reasonable range of heterogeneity, the profit-maximizing 
tolls are so high that overall welfare reduces compared to the baseline scenario of no-tolls. The 
empirical analysis by Small et al. (2005a), based on surveys among the users of SR-91, justified 
the relevance of the heterogeneity assumption.   
 
Small et al. (2005b) address the issue of optimal pricing policy for parallel roads. The empirical 
analysis is based on information from data surveys among the users of SR-91 before it was 
purchased by the OCTA. In the model, the travelers can choose between a free but congested 
roadway and a toll roadway. The authors show that such policies are inferior compared to ‘two-
way-toll’ as well as to ‘no-toll’ policies (for reasonable ranges of user heterogeneity). With   49 
application to SR-91, Small et al., suggest a pricing scheme that uses two-way-toll pricing 
policy but differentiates the prices of express lanes and regular lanes. This scheme improves 
efficiency more than other policies, and has less distorting effects for welfare distribution. 
 
This is in line with the theoretical paper by Palma et al. (2000). From the analysis by de Palma 
et al. (2000), who study competition in a duopoly setting under various ownership regimes, it 
appears that two private toll roads achieve higher allocative efficiency than free-access road 
infrastructure, and higher allocative efficiency than in the situation when they compete with 
public toll infrastructure. Efficiency increases if tolls are varied to eliminate queuing. The case 
of SR-91 supports the latter argument about the effectiveness of time-varying tolls to eliminate 
congestions and to improve the traffic flow on the road. It also highlights congestion issues that 
arise in the long run for free access roads of a given capacity.  
6.5  Conclusions 
The case studies highlight the importance of contractual design in road provision. Full private 
provision can work well under some circumstances (e.g. we did not observe large problems in 
the UK, where the concessions prevent excessive rents by private contractors), but can also lead 
to market power problems, as the last case study demonstrated. The lessons learned there: under 
contractual incompleteness, the private party should not be entrusted with market power, while 
the government has no instruments to curb the market power. 
 
Road provision by public-private partnerships provides the government with a better grip on the 
situation than in the case of private provision. In this case, the government is better able to limit 
the opportunity of traffic rationing by the private party to extract monopoly profit. From 
economic theory we know that one of the main benefits of public-private partnerships consists 
in the possibility of internalizing the externality with respect to the investment of the builder in 
the asset quality. The downside, however, is that it may be difficult to contractually specify the 
costs or quality of future services in advance (Hart, 1997, Bentz et al., 2005). Besides, such 
projects have a higher risk of ‘back-loading’ (i.e. intertemporal transfer of private rents towards 
the end of the project, see Maskin and Tirole, 2006). Flaws in contractual design may lead to 
excessive rents for the private contractor. So in the case of the Wijkertunnel, the contractual 
design did not accommodate the uncertainty about the actual development in a proper way, 
fixing the contract length and shadow toll, hence making revenue of the private contractor 
dependent on demand realizations. 
 
Flexible time-varying tolls work well in solving congestions on the tolled road, however, the 
coexistence of such a tolled road with a public freeway road is not optimal. Tolls divert the 
traffic from the tolled road to the free access road; as a result the free access road becomes even   50 
more congested than in the case when both roads are either tolled or free. Pricing both roads, 
but differentiating between the usual lanes and express lanes, is the most efficient in solving 
congestion, according to the literature (Palma et al., 2000, Small et al., 2005b).   51 
7  Conclusions 
Starting with a ‘greenfield’ situation, we have shown that leaving road infrastructure provision 
fully to the market is typically not optimal from a welfare perspective. Market failures in road 
provision can relate to (a) public good features such as non-excludability and non-rivalry; (b) 
market power of the owner; (c) external benefits in terms of labour mobility and positive 
spillovers; as well as (d) external costs, including congestion, pollution, and other 
environmental damage. 
  
If markets fail to deliver the optimal welfare outcome, government intervention can improve 
welfare. Government intervention comes in different forms, such as financial intervention 
(taxation, subsidies), regulation (price, quality, environmental), and public provision. The 
analysis of the literature regarding the government instruments allows us to establish a 
correspondence between the forms of market failures and instruments. 
 
Subsidies (compensating the owner for the external benefits that a private road delivers to the 
society) are the least restrictive and straightforward form of government intervention to 
encourage optimal investment. While subsidies are used to internalise external benefits, taxes 
work in the opposite way, providing an instrument to internalise external costs. However, not 
all types of market failures can be dealt with by financial instruments, e.g. financial instruments 
cannot prevent market power of the private owner. Besides, it may be difficult to determine the 
optimal amount of subsidies and taxes. 
 
Regulation is generally more intrusive than subsidies. However, one of its forms, called 
‘universal service obligation’ (USO), appears to be similar to subsidies economically. At first 
sight, the costs of USO are laid in the hand of the service provider. In general however, this cost 
is compensated by granting the provider rights that enable the provider to engage in cross-
subsidization.  
 
Price regulation such as restrictions on tolls can prevent excessive pricing by private owners. 
Historically, cost-based and price-cap regulation models have been used to establish the toll 
amount. However the modern theory and practice (from other sectors of the economy) point 
towards the use of more market-oriented regulation models, such as ‘yardstick competition’ and 
competition for the market, for example, through procurement auctions.  
 
Quality regulation can take a form of quality standards, e.g. with respect to safety and design. 
Such standards can be complemented by economic incentives, which can be created by 
integration of price and quality regulation. Environmental and safety norms can affect the   52 
design and the location of roads. Examples include norms on noise, norms restricting the 
distance of roads from residential houses, safety norms and so on.  
 
From the economic theory perspective, as long as quality is contracted, both private parties and 
government organisations should be equally able to deliver public goods and services. 
However, the outcome may be different in the case of non-contractible quality. In particular, 
private ownership is not optimal in the case of a large detrimental effect of cost reductions on 
non-contractible quality. The case for government provision is stronger if (i) significant 
opportunities for cost reductions lead to non-contractible deterioration of quality; (ii) 
innovations are relatively unimportant; (iii) competition is weak and consumer choice is 
ineffective; (iv) reputational mechanisms are also weak (Shleifer, 1998). 
 
Uncertainty about future developments may be another reason for the presence of the 
government in the road sector. Since the geography of the regions changes over time, so does 
the road infrastructure. For instance, it may be necessary to protect certain areas (such as natural 
areas, etc.) or to stimulate the development of transport infrastructure in newly built area. As it 
would be too costly to predict all possible contingencies that may be relevant for the 
development of the road infrastructure in the future, contracts with private providers are 
inheritably incomplete. Therefore, contractual design should not neglect the uncertainty 
regarding future changes. 
 
However, the economic literature also warns that government failure may arise when 
governments intervene. Government failure may be associated with information asymmetry, X-
inefficiency (especially under full government provision), lobbying, a short-term horizon of 
government officials, regulatory capture and corruption. Therefore, when choosing the degree 
of intervention, the government should take the risk of government failure into account. The 
welfare loss due to government failure should be weighed against the welfare loss of market 
failure. 
 
Given the chain-character of road infrastructure provision, finding the optimal allocation of 
tasks between the government and private contractors is challenging. Under a public-private 
partnership (PPP), the government bundles several stages of the production chain. For example, 
it lets the same private contractor to build and to operate the asset. This provides the private 
contractor with better incentives to do quality enhancing investment at the building stage. The 
downside, however, is that it may be difficult to contractually specify the costs or quality of 
future services in advance. Besides, such projects have a higher risk of ‘back-loading’ (i.e. 
intertemporal transfer of private rents towards the end of the project). Both costs and benefits 
should be taken into account when choosing for a PPP. 
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The case studies highlight that full private provision can work well under some circumstances, 
but can also lead to market power problems. Under contractual incompleteness, the government 
should not entrust a private party with market power, while leaving itself no instruments to curb 
this market power (as happened in the case of the State Route 91, in California). Road provision 
by public-private partnerships provides the government with a better grip on the situation than 
in the case of private provision. However, here again, flaws in contractual design may lead to 
excessive rents for the private contractor. So in the case of the Wijkertunnel, the rents of the 
private providers increase substantially with the increase of traffic volumes. 
 
With respect to congestion issues, we observe (based on the theoretical and empirical literature) 
that flexible time-varying tolls work well solving congestion on a tolled road. However, the 
coexistence of such a tolled road with a public freeway road is not optimal: tolls divert the 
traffic from the tolled road to the free access road. As a result, the free access road becomes 
even more congested than in the case when both roads are either tolled or free. Therefore, 
pricing both roads, but differentiating between usual lanes and express lanes, is the most 
efficient option in solving congestion.  
 
An important conclusion that we draw from both the economic literature and the case studies is 
that the optimal pattern of the road infrastructure provision is often very sensitive to particular 
circumstances: what works well in one situation, may not be suitable for another. For example, 
private provision (and ownership) of low-volume roads by local cooperatives works 
successfully in sparsely populated parts of Sweden, but almost unthinkable in many other 
countries, because of both geographic and political reasons. Moreover, even when the same 
government instrument is applied, the outcome in each situation is also sensitive to the 
particular contractual design used. Think of toll concessions, where the outcome is sensitive to 
the way of incorporation of traffic forecasts in the contractual framework. 
 
There are however general principles essential for efficient road provision, such as the 
importance of the government presence in coordination of road provision (land policy), 
regulation of safety and other quality norms, creating a good investment climate for private 
parties by reducing legal and political risks. With the development of market economies, the 
role of the government has been transforming from the sole provider towards a market creator 
(creating competition for the market) and/or partner in a public-private project. The latter 
organizational form provides the possibility of attracting private capital as well as exploring the 
benefits of a more optimal risk sharing between the public and private sector. The theoretical 
literature on this subject is however rather limited and general. Few papers address this issue, 
focusing specifically on the road networks and the road production chain. There is a need for 
more theoretical and applied research on the effect of road provision policies to fill this gap, 
which in our view represents an important direction for future research on this topic.   54   55 
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Appendix: types of PPPs 
Public-private partnerships (PPP) refer to contractual agreements formed between a public 
agency and private sector entity that allow for greater private sector participation in the delivery 
of infrastructure projects. These projects combine both public and private characteristics. 
Traditionally, private sector participation in infrastructure development has been limited to 
separate contracts on planning, design or construction contracts, paying to the private 
contractors a fee for their service. However, the private sector role has been expanding in recent 
years.  
 
PPPs’ potential revenue is a better risk division between public and private parties and a higher 
ambition of the project, as they commit the parties to each other. However, there is a danger of 
non-cooperative behaviour in different stages of the project. (Canoy et al., 2001).   
 
The IMF defines a typical PPP as a DBFO (design-build-finance-operate) structure, however, 
much more possibilities exist. In addition to the DBFO structure, other structures have been 
used, such as BOO (build-own-operate), BDO (build-develop-operate), DCMF (design-
construct-manage-finance), BOOT (build-own-operate-transfer) and BLOT (build-lease-
operate-transfer). (Bentz et al., 2005.) 
 
For instance, a range of PPPs has been used in the road provision and operation in the US.
26 The 




26 There are also some experiences with PPP projects for public roads in the Netherlands, such as  
the High Speed Line South and the A59 and N31 motorways. According to the Ministry of Transport, Public Works and 
Water Management, PPPs will be structurally applied to new infrastructure projects in the coming years. (Source: 
http://www.verkeerenwaterstaat.nl.)  
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Basic project delivery options for roads in the US 
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Design-Build   Public  Public  Private by fee contract  Public  Public 
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Public  Public or 
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private 
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Source: http://www.fhwa.dot.gov/ppp/project_delivery_options.pdf 
 
 
 